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Introduction and Motivation 
There is no universal provider of health insurance or health care in the 
United States. Rather, a patchwork system of institutions exists, each 
covering different subgroups of the population. Certain types of health 
insurance are provided as a condition of employment, while other types 
of health insurance are more readily available when individuals are not 
employed or not fully employed, and still others are available regardless 
of employment status. The two most signiﬁcant sources of health insur-
ance coverage in the United States are employers, who collectively insure 
63 percent of the non-elderly (below age 65) population, and govern-
ments, who collectively cover 16.8 percent of the non-elderly population. 
Other types of insurance, such as individually purchased policies, or cov-
erage obtained through an educational institution or other organization, 
provide the remaining 6.7 percent of the non-elderly population with 
health insurance coverage. However, a nontrivial fraction of the popula-
tion, 17.7 percent or 44.7 million individuals, is uninsured. 
As its title suggests, this paper considers the relationship between 
the U.S. health care system and the labor market. The second section   
describes some of the salient features of and facts about the system of 
health insurance coverage in the United States, particularly the role of 
employers. Much academic and media attention has been focused on 
the presumption that the relationship between the labor market and the 
type(s) of health insurance coverage available to individuals may motivate 
some individuals and ﬁrms to make different labor market decisions than 
they would otherwise, in ways that adversely impact overall labor market   
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performance. The third section summarizes this empirical evidence, exam-
ining how health insurance impacts labor market outcomes, such as wages, 
labor supply (including retirement, female labor supply, part-time versus 
full-time work, and formal versus informal sector work), labor demand 
(including hours worked and the composition of employment across 
full-time, part-time, and temporary workers), and job turnover. But the 
implications of the relationship between employer-provided health insur-
ance and the labor market are not limited to labor market outcomes. The 
fourth section discusses the implications of having a fragmented system of 
health insurance delivery—in which the employer plays a central role—on 
the health care system and health care outcomes. The paper concludes 
with some thoughts on the long-run sustainability of this system. 
Health Insurance Institutions in the United States 
The most prevalent type of health insurance, covering 62 percent of the 
non-elderly U.S. population, is employer-provided health insurance cov-
erage (Kaiser Family Foundation and Health Research and Educational 
Trust 2004). About half of those covered receive this type of insurance 
by virtue of their own employment, while the rest receive it as dependents 
of a spouse or parent who is employed. Employers in the United States 
who provide health insurance do so voluntarily, and many individuals 
(17 percent of those not self-employed) work in ﬁrms where such ben-
eﬁts are not offered (Fronstin 1999). Even in those ﬁrms where health 
insurance is provided as a beneﬁt, not all employees are necessarily eli-
gible, and those who are eligible must generally elect coverage in order 
to receive it. Indeed, only 62 percent of wage and salary workers are eli-
gible to receive health insurance beneﬁts through their own employment, 
and 17 percent of those individuals decline the coverage that is avail-
able to them (although they may receive health insurance from another 
source) (Fronstin 1999). Some employers also provide health insurance 
to former employees who have retired, so-called “retiree” health insur-
ance. At present, about 29 percent of ﬁrms employing more than 500 
workers offer health insurance to current and future retirees (Fronstin 
and Salisbury 2003, citing the Mercer/Foster-Higgins National Survey of 
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this coverage, however, has been declining quite substantially over time, 
and is likely to continue to decline. 
Various types of government insurance programs cover most, but not all, 
of the population who are not covered by employer-provided insurance. 
It is interesting that, even at the governmental level, there is no single uni-
ﬁed health insurance program. By far the largest government health insur-
ance program is Medicare, which was implemented in 1965 to provide 
health insurance coverage to individuals aged 65 and over, many of whom 
were left uninsured or underinsured upon their retirement when coverage 
through their former employers ceased.1 Medicare also covers some indi-
viduals under age 65, speciﬁcally those who are disabled and eligible for 
Social Security Disability Insurance. Currently, Medicare covers more than 
96 percent of those over age 65, and 5 percent of those under age 65. 
Medicaid is a state-run health insurance program funded jointly by 
the federal and various state governments. (Some states call the program 
by different names; for example, in California the program is referred to 
as “Medi-Cal.”) Historically, this was a health insurance program for 
public assistance recipients, primarily low-income single mothers and 
their children, and also a source of supplemental insurance for the low-
income elderly. In recent years, it has been expanded to provide coverage 
to non-welfare-eligible families with modest incomes, particularly those 
with children. There is great heterogeneity across states in the eligibil-
ity requirements for Medicaid and in the beneﬁts that are actually pro-
vided. Overall, 9 percent of the elderly are covered by Medicaid, as are 
12 percent of the non-elderly (Fronstin 2003). The federal government 
also provides health insurance to members of the uniformed services and 
their families. About 3 percent of the non-elderly population are covered 
by this type of health insurance (Fronstin 2003). 
Various other types of private insurance cover about 7 percent of the 
non-elderly population, and perhaps as much as one-third of the elderly 
population. These include individually purchased policies from private 
insurance companies such as Blue Cross/Blue Shield, insurance provided 
through membership organizations such as a trade union or professional 
association, university-provided health insurance for college students, and 
supplemental insurance for the Medicare-eligible elderly, often referred 
to as “Medigap” coverage.
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This patchwork system of health insurance coverage leaves many peo-
ple uninsured: those who do not have health insurance through their 
own or a family member’s employment, those who are not old enough or 
disabled enough to qualify for Medicare, those who are not eligible for 
or decline to participate in Medicaid, and those who either cannot afford 
or choose not to purchase health insurance in the private market. The 
estimated 43 million uninsured individuals in the United States represent 
about 17 percent of the non-elderly population (Fronstin 2003). Thanks 
in large part to Medicare, only a small fraction of the elderly (65+), about 
one percent, are uninsured. 
It is interesting to consider why the United States, in contrast to most 
other developed countries, has a health insurance system in which employ-
ers, rather than the government, are the primary providers of insurance, at 
least for the non-elderly.2 The United States has repeatedly rejected broad 
attempts to “socialize” the provision of either medical care or health 
insurance. The ﬁrst such initiative, during the 1930s, failed despite the 
concurrent genesis of so many other government social programs (includ-
ing Social Security, Unemployment Insurance, and the Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children program, the precursor to contemporary public 
assistance programs for low-income families). The most recent initiative 
was the failed Clinton administration attempt at national health reform in 
1993, although there were other unsuccessful attempts in the interim. 
Even though there are some limited examples of U.S. companies’ pro-
viding health insurance coverage before World War II, employer-provided 
health insurance, as an institution, really came into being during the two 
decades following the war. In the absence of universal government-pro-
vided health insurance coverage, market forces pushed employers into 
their role as the primary providers of insurance. These market forces 
are several, and include: a substantial price advantage given to employ-
ers through the tax code, since ﬁrms’ health insurance expenditures on 
behalf of their employees are not counted as taxable income to either the 
ﬁrm or the employees; signiﬁcant economies of scale that derive from 
providing health insurance to a large group of individuals; and the ability 
to pool individuals into insurance groups in a way that largely overcomes 
the problem of adverse selection, which plagues the individual market for 
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Empirical Evidence on Health Insurance and Labor Market Outcomes 
With this understanding of how the various U.S. health insurance institu-
tions work, we can now consider the relationship between health insur-
ance and labor market outcomes. This section describes some of the key 
empirical estimates of the relationship between health insurance and 
labor market outcomes, including retirement, employment, full-time ver-
sus part-time work, and job turnover. It does not, however, go into great 
detail on the strengths and weaknesses of the various empirical studies 
that are cited. Currie and Madrian (1999); Gruber (2000); and Gruber 
and Madrian (2004) provide greater detail on the data and methods used 
in the studies cited in this paper (and many others), and offer opinions on 
the relative merit of the different empirical approaches. 
Retirement and the Labor Supply of Older Workers 
Perhaps the most important labor market outcome to consider is employ-
ment itself—how does health insurance affect individual participation 
in the labor market? The potential impact of health insurance on labor 
force participation derives from the fact that, for some individuals, being 
employed is the cheapest (and perhaps even the only) way to obtain health 
insurance, while for other individuals, not being employed is in fact the 
cheapest way to obtain health insurance. In the decision about whether 
or not to be employed, health insurance will be a more important factor 
for individuals who place high value on health insurance—those with 
high anticipated medical expenditures either for themselves or for their 
dependents. Because medical expenditures tend to increase with age, 
individuals approaching retirement should be particularly interested in 
maintaining their health insurance coverage. 
It should not be surprising, then, that the most widely studied facet 
of labor force participation that has been examined in the literature on 
health insurance and labor market outcomes is retirement: to what extent 
does health insurance determine when and how individuals choose to 
withdraw from the labor force? Health insurance is a potentially impor-
tant determinant of retirement outcomes because some types of health 
insurance are more portable across the transition from work to retire-
ment than are others. Employer-provided health insurance is typically 
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lost upon retirement, for example; in companies that provide retiree 
health coverage, however, employer-provided health insurance is porta-
ble—individuals retain their coverage even after they retire. Health insur-
ance that comes from a source other than one’s own employment would 
also be portable, including individual health insurance purchased in the 
private market or employer-provided coverage obtained as a dependent 
through one’s spouse, so long as the spouse does not lose coverage. 
If health insurance is not portable across the transition from work to 
retirement, the potential loss of health insurance coverage associated with 
leaving the workforce creates a deterrent to retirement. Thus, we would 
expect retirement rates to be higher among those with portable health 
insurance. Once individuals reach age 65 and are eligible for Medicare, 
completely losing health insurance coverage is no longer a concern for 
those workers previously covered by employer-provided health insur-
ance. Thus, after age 65, retirement rates among those with nonportable 
insurance will no longer be lower, and, indeed, may increase, if individu-
als have postponed retirement until becoming eligible for Medicare.3
The empirical evidence on health insurance and retirement largely con-
curs with these theoretical predictions. Several studies have found con-
sistent evidence that individuals whose employers provide retiree health 
insurance leave the labor force earlier than individuals whose employers 
do not. For example, Rust and Phelan (1997) estimate that retiree health 
insurance increases the probability of retiring before age 65 by 12 to 29 
percent (the effects vary with age); Karoly and Rogowski (1994) and 
Rogowski and Karoly (2000) estimate effects ranging from 47 to 62 per-
cent; while Blau and Gilleskie (2001) estimate effects ranging from 26 to 
80 percent. Madrian (1994a) ﬁnds that individuals with access to retiree 
health insurance leave the labor market between 6 and 18 months earlier 
than individuals who do not have access to retiree health insurance, and 
they are also much more likely to retire before the age of 65. 
Individuals who are covered by non-employment-based health insur-
ance, for example, through policies purchased individually in the private 
market, through trade associations, or through Medicaid, also have a 
type of health insurance coverage that is portable across the transition 
from work to retirement. Rust and Phelan (1997) extend their analysis 
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retiree health insurance, individuals with such coverage also have higher 
retirement rates than individuals who would lose their health insurance 
coverage upon retirement. Johnson, Davidoff, and Perese (2003) look at 
the health insurance-related costs of retiring more generally, and ﬁnd that 
the higher these costs are, the less likely individuals are to retire. 
One set of institutions designed to increase the portability of employer-
provided health insurance, both across the transition from work to retire-
ment and for other labor market transitions as well (for example, job 
change), are state and federal “continuation of coverage” laws. These 
include two well-known federal laws that go by the acronyms “COBRA” 
(for the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act) and “HIPAA” 
(for the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act). COBRA 
and other similar state-level continuation of coverage laws mandate that 
employers must allow employees and their dependents the option to con-
tinue purchasing health insurance through the employer’s health plan for 
a speciﬁed period of time after coverage would otherwise terminate, even 
if the employee is no longer employed by the ﬁrm.4 HIPAA restricts the 
ability of insurers to impose pre-existing condition exclusions on indi-
viduals who change their health insurance coverage.5 Both of these laws 
reduce the costs in terms of potential health insurance coverage loss asso-
ciated with either retiring or changing jobs. 
Although no research has yet been done on the impact of HIPAA on 
retirement, Gruber and Madrian (1995) examine the effect of COBRA 
and its state-level precursors on retirement. They ﬁnd that among those 
with employer-provided health insurance, these continuation of coverage 
laws increase the probability of retiring by 30 percent; in contrast, among 
those without employer-provided health insurance, for whom the laws 
provide no beneﬁt, continuation of coverage has no effect on retirement. 
These results, using a relatively exogenous source of variation in the por-
tability of health insurance, conﬁrm that retirement is very sensitive to 
health insurance availability. 
An interesting thing happens at age 65 when individuals become eli-
gible for Medicare. Even for those individuals with employer-provided 
health insurance that does not continue into retirement, leaving the labor 
force no longer implies a loss of health insurance, because individuals are 
covered by Medicare. Thus, Medicare eligibility should provide a strong 
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retirement incentive for those individuals not eligible for retiree health 
insurance. And indeed, a substantial fraction of 64-year-olds do retire at 
age 65, when they become eligible for Medicare. Empirical research has 
to date been unable to quantify the magnitude of this Medicare effect 
because age 65 also happens to be the Social Security normal retirement 
age and the age at which many pension plans provide full retirement 
beneﬁts. With so many other factors motivating retirement that are coin-
cident with Medicare eligibility, it is difﬁcult to quantify exactly how big 
each of the respective effects is. But the evidence on how other types of 
health insurance affect retirement suggest that Medicare eligibility should 
be very important as well.
One idiosyncratic feature of Medicare relative to other types of health 
insurance, and one that also generates interesting variations in retirement 
behavior, is that Medicare covers only individuals and not spouses or 
dependent children. As a result, the retirement decisions of two individu-
als without retiree health insurance who are both about to turn 65, one 
with a spouse who is younger and the other with a spouse who is older, 
could be quite different. For the individual with the older spouse, retire-
ment at the age of Medicare eligibility will result in a loss of health insur-
ance coverage for neither spouse—both will be covered by Medicare (the 
older spouse already is). In contrast, retirement at the age of Medicare 
eligibility for the individual with a younger spouse will result in a loss 
of health insurance coverage for the spouse if the spouse was covered 
as a dependent on the employee’s plan and not through his or her own 
independent coverage. Interestingly, Madrian and Beaulieu (1998) ﬁnd 
that men with younger wives are less likely to retire than are men with 
older wives, until their spouses also become eligible for Medicare. Thus, 
retirement is affected not only by one’s own Medicare eligibility, but also 
by the Medicare eligibility of one’s spouse. 
Health insurance also impacts the nature of the transition from work 
to retirement. Some individuals move from full-time work to full-time 
retirement, while others pursue a more gradual transition from work 
to retirement, moving from full-time work to part-time work (so-called 
bridge jobs), and then eventually to full-time retirement. Although many 
older workers, when asked, express a desire to make a gradual transi-
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this before becoming eligible for Medicare while also maintaining health 
insurance coverage. This is because employer-provided health insurance 
in the United States is typically contingent upon full-time employment; 
very few employers provide health insurance beneﬁts to part-time employ-
ees. Individuals with retiree health insurance, however, can retire from 
their full-time job and move to a different part-time or self-employment 
job while maintaining health insurance through their former employer. 
Research has shown that individuals with retiree health insurance are 
indeed much more likely to make a gradual transition from work to 
retirement than are individuals without retiree health insurance (Quinn 
1997). Thus, health insurance that is portable across the transition from 
work to retirement appears to be an institution that enables individuals 
to retire both when and how they desire. 
Health Insurance Eligibility through Government Public Assistance 
Programs and Labor Supply
While much of the research on how health insurance affects labor force 
participation has been directed at the issue of retirement, older indi-
viduals are certainly not the only ones whose employment decisions 
are impacted by health insurance. Another margin along which health 
insurance might affect labor market outcomes is through the labor sup-
ply decisions of potential public assistance recipients. A key feature of 
the two primary public assistance programs in the United States (TANF, 
or Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, and SSI, or Supplemental 
Security Income) is that, in addition to qualifying for cash and other 
beneﬁts, recipients qualify for Medicaid—health insurance provided by 
the states to public assistance recipients and potentially to other low-
income individuals. Because the groups who qualify for these types of 
programs—low-income families headed by single mothers and the low-
income disabled and elderly—tend to qualify for low-wage, low-skilled 
jobs without health insurance, the coupling of Medicaid with public 
assistance encourages individuals to sign up for and remain enrolled in 
public assistance programs. 
Overall, the literature suggests that health insurance availability, and 
Medicaid in particular, has either no effect (Meyer and Rosenbaum 2000; 
Blank 1989; Montgomery and Navin 2000; Decker 1993; and Ham and 
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Shore-Sheppard 2005) or only a small effect (Yelowitz 1995; Mofﬁtt and 
Wolfe 1992; and Winkler 1991) on the labor force participation of low-
income single mothers. This is somewhat surprising, given the potential 
importance of health insurance for this population and their children. 
On the other hand, there is some evidence that the decision to partici-
pate in welfare programs, conditional on labor supply decisions, is fairly 
responsive to the availability of health insurance (Ellwood and Adams 
1990; Mofﬁtt and Wolfe 1992; Decker 1993; and Yelowitz 1996, 1998a, 
1998b, and 2000), an interesting ﬁnding in its own right, and one with 
important public policy implications. 
The Labor Supply of Married Women 
Married women, and to a lesser extent married men, are another group 
whose labor force participation is likely to be impacted by the avail-
ability of health insurance coverage. Although most of the interest in the 
effect of health insurance on labor force participation in both policy and 
academic circles has been focused on older workers and public assistance 
recipients, the potential impact in terms of the aggregate effect on total 
hours worked may very well be largest for prime-aged workers, particu-
larly married women who are typically estimated to have a large labor 
supply elasticity. Given the responsiveness of married women to wage 
changes, one might expect sensitivity to the availability of health insur-
ance coverage as well. 
Because most companies that offer health insurance make it avail-
able to both employees and their spouses, many married women receive 
health insurance coverage through their spouses. Whether or not a mar-
ried women has health insurance through her spouse turns out to be a 
very important factor in whether and how much married women work. 
Married women with health insurance through their husbands are 7 to 
20 percentage points less likely to work than are women without health 
insurance from their spouses (Buchmueller and Valletta 1999; Olson 
1998; Schone and Vistnes 2000; and Wellington and Cobb-Clark 2000). 
Among those who do work, they are much more likely to be employed 
in part-time jobs that typically do not provide health insurance than in 
full-time jobs (Buchmueller and Valletta 1999; Olson 1998; Schone and 
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women, the lack of health insurance from a spouse’s employment seems 
to have a strong inﬂuence in motivating married women to ﬁnd jobs with 
health insurance themselves. 
In one of the few studies of health insurance and the labor market 
using non-U.S. data, Chou and Staiger (2001) examine the effects of 
health insurance on spousal labor supply in Taiwan. Before March 1995, 
when Taiwan implemented a new national health insurance program, 
health insurance was provided primarily through one of three govern-
ment-sponsored health plans that covered workers in different sectors 
of the economy. Historically, these plans covered only workers and not 
their dependents. Thus, own employment was the only way for most 
individuals to obtain health insurance. However, there was one excep-
tion—coverage for spouses was extended to government workers in 
1982, and subsequently to children and parents as well. By exploiting 
this variation in the availability of dependent health insurance coverage, 
Chou and Staiger (2001) are able to identify the effect of health insurance 
on employment. They estimate that the labor force participation rate of 
women married to government employees declined by about 3 percent 
after they were able to obtain coverage as spousal dependents relative 
to the labor force participation rate of women married to private-sector 
workers. They estimate similar declines in labor force participation for 
the wives of private-sector workers following the 1995 implementation 
of the National Health Insurance program, which made health insurance 
available to all individuals. Their results are largely corroborated in an 
analogous study by Chou and Liu (2000), using a different data set on 
labor force participation in Taiwan. 
A recent study of married women’s labor supply in Spain uncovered 
another interesting link between health insurance ﬁnance and female 
labor supply (De la Rica and Lemieux 1994). In Spain, health care is 
provided by the government and ﬁnanced out of a mandatory payroll 
tax paid partially by the ﬁrm and partially by the employee. Payment of 
the payroll tax entitles workers and their spouses and dependent chil-
dren to health care, as well as to a pension and sick leave. Among men, 
compliance with the payroll tax is nearly universal. Among married 
women, however, over one-quarter of those who are employed work in 
the “underground” economy where “required” taxes are not paid. 
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Only two studies have examined empirically the effect of health insur-
ance on the labor force participation decisions of prime-aged men. The 
ﬁrst, by Wellington and Cobb-Clark (2000), examines the effect of spou-
sal health insurance on the employment decisions of both husbands and 
wives. As noted earlier, they ﬁnd large effects of husbands’ health insur-
ance on the labor force participation of married women. They also ﬁnd 
an effect of spousal health insurance on the labor force participation of 
married men: having a wife with health insurance reduces husbands’ 
labor force participation, although the effect is less than half the size of 
the effect estimated for married women. 
The only other study of health insurance and employment among 
prime-aged men, Gruber and Madrian (1997), exploits the continuation 
of coverage mandates discussed earlier in the context of retirement, to 
consider the impact of health insurance on the transition from employ-
ment to nonemployment and on the subsequent duration of nonemploy-
ment. This study ﬁnds that the availability of continuation of coverage 
increases the likelihood of experiencing a spell of nonemployment by 
about 15 percent and also increases the total amount of time spent non-
employed by about 15 percent. 
Overall, the body of empirical literature on the effects of health insur-
ance on the labor supply of married women and other prime-aged work-
ers gives strong and consistent support to the notion that health insurance 
affects individual labor supply decisions. When there is a ready source 
of health insurance available that is not attached to one’s own employ-
ment, individuals (particularly married women) are much less likely to be 
employed. This suggests that the institutional link between health insur-
ance and employment may be a signiﬁcant factor in the employment deci-
sions of individuals. 
There are many other, less studied avenues through which health insur-
ance is likely to impact labor supply. The link between Medicare cover-
age and the receipt of Social Security Disability Insurance for disabled 
individuals under the age of 65 could act as a deterrent to work among 
the disabled, or at least to work that would be sufﬁcient to disqualify 
them from further disability payments and the health insurance (Medi-
care) that accompanies these beneﬁts. University-provided health insur-
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student health plans if they maintain their student status, which typically 
involves registering for a certain number of credit hours and maintaining 
satisfactory grades. Employment, or at least full-time employment, may 
jeopardize an individual’s ability to maintain status as a student. Thus, 
some students who value their health insurance may be deterred from 
entering the labor market. Anecdotally, this tends to take the form of 
delaying graduation. 
Health Insurance and Job Choice 
Beyond the full-time versus part-time dimension of labor supply, health 
insurance also has the potential to impact the initial choice of where to 
work and subsequent decisions about whether to change jobs, including 
the choice about whether or not to become self-employed. Economists are 
interested in the issue of job turnover because it is the process by which 
workers are reallocated away from jobs where they are less productive 
and into jobs where they are more productive. Impediments to productiv-
ity-enhancing job turnover are thus a barrier to economic growth. 
Why does health insurance impact job turnover? One obvious reason 
is that not all employers offer health insurance. Individuals who have 
employer-provided health insurance and place a high value on it will be 
reluctant to switch to a company that does not provide health insur-
ance. In addition, individuals who do not have employer-provided health 
insurance and who place a high value on it may attempt to ﬁnd jobs 
at companies that do provide health insurance. An interesting piece of 
evidence on this front comes from the behavior of married men who are 
working in jobs without health insurance. If these men have pregnant 
wives, they are twice as likely to change jobs as are married men without 
health insurance whose wives are not pregnant (Madrian 1994b). The 
impending birth of a child clearly increases the value of health insur-
ance, and these men clearly respond by changing jobs, presumably in an 
attempt to ﬁnd a position with health insurance. 
A second reason that health insurance affects the job turnover deci-
sions of individuals is that not all employer-provided health insurance 
plans are equal, at least not for an employee who contemplates changing 
jobs. In addition to variation across employers in the generosity of the 
health insurance package in terms of co-payments, deductibles, and what 
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is and is not covered, there are two additional subtle issues to consider. 
The ﬁrst is that many employers exclude pre-existing conditions for a 
certain period of time. So, even though a new employer and one’s current 
employer may appear to provide identical coverage, the coverage of the 
new employer may, in fact, be vastly inferior for families with medical 
problems if these problems are not covered under the terms of a pre-exist-
ing-condition exclusion restriction. The second issue is that employers do 
not generally offer their employees free choice among the universe of 
medical providers in the health insurance plans that they provide. Thus, 
an employment change that is accompanied by a health insurance change 
may also necessitate a medical provider change. Individuals who value 
relationships with their current doctors may be averse to changing health 
insurance plans even if pre-existing conditions are not an issue. 
My own research on the relationship between health insurance and job 
turnover suggests that health insurance is, indeed, an important factor in 
the decision to change jobs. One interesting ﬁnding is that among individ-
uals who have employer-provided health insurance, those who also have 
coverage through the employment of a spouse are much more likely to 
change jobs than those who do not (Madrian 1994b). In essence, health 
insurance coverage through a spouse’s employment is portable across the 
transition from one job to another, and is one way to skirt the pre-exist-
ing-condition exclusions that may be in place at a new employer. Another 
interesting ﬁnding is that COBRA, in addition to motivating retirement 
among older workers, also motivates job turnover among younger work-
ers (Gruber and Madrian 1994). COBRA makes the health insurance 
from one’s former employer portable across jobs, at least for a limited 
time, but long enough to avoid pre-existing-condition exclusions. 
Beyond my own work, the broader literature on health insurance and 
job choice is more divided. About one-third of the papers studied ﬁnd that 
health insurance signiﬁcantly impacts the job choice decisions made by 
workers, with a potential loss of health insurance as a result of job change 
acting as a deterrent to job turnover, and a potential gain in health insur-
ance leading to increased mobility (Cooper and Monheit 1993; Madrian 
1994b; Gruber and Madrian 1994; Anderson 1997; and Stroupe, Kin-
ney, and Kniesner 2001). Another one-third of the papers ﬁnd no sig-
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1982; Holtz-Eakin 1994; Penrod 1994; Holtz-Eakin, Penrod, and Rosen 
1996; Slade 1997; Kapur 1998; and Spaulding 1997). And the remaining 
one-third ﬁnd evidence that varies by empirical speciﬁcation or subgroup 
analyzed or ﬁnd effects that are not statistically signiﬁcant at standard 
levels (Buchmueller and Valletta 1996; Brunetti et al. 2000; Madrian 
and Lefgren 1998; Berger, Black, and Scott 2004; and Gilleskie and Lutz 
2002). It is interesting to note that a fair number of the studies that ﬁnd 
a signiﬁcant effect of health insurance on job choice obtain estimates that 
are fairly similar in magnitude—the potential loss of employer-provided 
health insurance associated with job change reduces job mobility by 25 
to 50 percent (Cooper and Monheit 1993; Madrian 1994b; Buchmueller 
and Valletta 1996; and Stroupe, Kinney, and Kniesner 2001). 
It is also interesting to consider the relationship between health insur-
ance and job turnover from the employer’s perspective. For an employer 
that offers health insurance coverage, a sick employee is costly in two 
ways. First, a sick employee may be less productive. Second, a sick 
employee (or a healthy employee with sick dependents) is likely to gener-
ate higher insurance claims. Because of their medical expenditures, these 
employees may be relatively more attractive targets for layoffs. The link 
between health insurance and employment may thus have an adverse 
impact on families with medical problems if these problems lead to 
claims-based layoffs. 
Health Insurance and Labor Demand 
In addition to its impact on the employment and job choice decisions 
of individuals, health insurance may also affect the labor demand deci-
sions of employers. There are two features of health insurance provi-
sion that are particularly salient in this regard. The ﬁrst is that health 
insurance is a ﬁxed cost of employment. Expected employer expenditures 
on health insurance do not increase when the weekly hours worked by 
their employees increase, and they do not increase when compensation 
increases. They increase only when more employees are hired. This ﬁxed-
cost feature of employer-provided health insurance gives ﬁrms an incen-
tive to economize on the costs of providing health insurance in two ways. 
The ﬁrst is by hiring fewer employees but at longer weekly hours—this 
is one way to maintain production while reducing the overall costs of   
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providing health insurance. The second is by hiring fewer but more 
productive employees—those who can produce more than the average 
employee would. Cutler and Madrian (1998) provide partial evidence 
that ﬁrms have substituted using long weekly hours of fewer workers for 
employing more workers as health insurance costs have increased over 
recent years. Moreover, the effects are nontrivial. The increase in weekly 
hours associated with the increase in health insurance costs between 1980 
and 1993 resulted in a change in average weekly hours among those with 
health insurance equivalent to roughly half the change in labor input that 
is observed in a typical recession. Baicker and Chandra (2006) examine 
the impact of rising health insurance costs on employment and ﬁnd that 
a 10 percent increase in health premiums reduces the aggregate employ-
ment rate by 1.6 percent. 
The second feature of health insurance that is salient to the labor 
demand decision is the distinction between full-time and part-time work-
ers in the tax treatment of employer expenditures on health insurance. 
These expenditures are usually not subject to taxation—with one caveat: 
employers must satisfy a set of Internal Revenue Service nondiscrimina-
tion rules, which stipulate that if a ﬁrm is to provide health insurance, it 
must make it widely available to substantively all employees. In essence, 
employers cannot selectively decide that they will provide health insur-
ance to some employees and not to others, either because of favoritism or 
as a cost-saving measure. However, certain groups of employees, namely 
part-time, temporary, and seasonal workers, are exempt from the require-
ments of the nondiscrimination rules. Thus, employers can deny health 
insurance coverage to part-time, temporary, and seasonal workers while 
still obtaining favorable tax treatment for their health insurance expen-
ditures on full-time permanent employees. As health insurance becomes 
more expensive to provide, the nondiscrimination rules give employers 
an incentive to hire part-time and temporary workers in lieu of full-time 
workers as a way to economize on insurance expenditures. This could 
account for some of the phenomenal growth in the temporary services 
industry over the past two decades. 
More concrete evidence that employers substitute from full-time to 
part-time workers in the face of higher health insurance costs comes from 
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health insurance to full-time workers but not to part-time workers. Thur-
ston (1997) ﬁnds that those industries most affected by the mandate, 
namely, industries in which relatively few full-time workers were initially 
covered by health insurance, saw large increases in the fraction of work-
ers employed in part-time jobs. In contrast, industries in which almost 
all full-time employees were already receiving health insurance saw little 
shift in the fraction of full-time versus part-time workers. Baicker and 
Chandra (2006) also ﬁnd a shift to part-time employment as a result of 
recent increases in health insurance costs. 
Thus, health insurance affects both the size and composition of the 
workforce that ﬁrms employ. As health insurance becomes more costly to 
provide, employers have an incentive to reduce their health insurance costs 
by substituting overtime for employment, skilled labor for unskilled labor, 
and part-time and temporary workers for regular full-time employees. 
Health Insurance and Wages 
A ﬁnal labor market outcome of interest is of wages, which are deter-
mined jointly by the labor supply decisions of individuals and by the 
labor demand decisions of employers. From the ﬁrm’s perspective, pro-
viding health insurance imposes an additional compensation cost on the 
employer and will reduce the level of wages it is willing to offer for a 
given level of labor input. From the worker’s perspective, employer-pro-
vided health insurance is simply another form of compensation and will 
reduce the level of wages required to supply a given level of labor input. 
In a competitive labor market, the level of total compensation received by 
employees will be determined by worker productivity. The composition 
of that compensation between wages and fringe beneﬁts will be dictated 
by the value that employees place on having employer-provided health 
insurance relative to the cost to the employer of providing it. If employ-
ees value employer-provided health insurance at less than the cost to the 
employer of providing it, the ﬁrm will not be able to pass on to workers 
the full cost of offering the insurance in the form of lower wages and will 
opt not to provide health insurance. That employers do provide health 
insurance would seem to indicate that at least some employees are willing 
to accept a wage reduction at least equivalent to the cost to the ﬁrm of 
providing the insurance. 
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Given the inherent risks of being uninsured, risk-averse individuals 
should value having some sort of health insurance, although as noted 
above in Section II, there may be more than one way to obtain this 
insurance. The value to employees of having employer-provided health 
insurance has already been mentioned: the tax deductibility of employer 
expenditures on health insurance, the economies of scale from providing 
health insurance to a large group of individuals, and the ability to pool 
individuals into insurance groups in a way that largely overcomes the 
problem of adverse selection, which plagues the individual market for 
health insurance. These advantages of employer-provided health insur-
ance are potentially large, and we should expect many employees to be 
willing to accept a wage reduction at least equivalent to the cost to their 
employer of providing health insurance. However, some individuals have 
cheaper health insurance available from another source (for example, the 
government or a family member), and they may place a very low value on 
having employer-provided health insurance from their own employer. 
Despite the strong presumption of a trade-off between wages and 
health insurance, the early literature on this topic was focused not on 
the magnitude of the wage-health insurance trade-off, but rather on the 
reasons why researchers could not ﬁnd evidence that there is a trade-
off (Currie and Madrian 1999). The fundamental problem was a lack 
of appropriate data for estimating the magnitude of any such relation-
ship. More recent studies that have been careful to ﬁnd suitable data 
and to specify carefully the empirical relationship have found evidence 
of a trade-off. Gruber and Krueger (1991) and Gruber (1994) exploit 
exogenous changes in the cost of beneﬁts offered to workers and ﬁnd that 
essentially the full amount of these cost increases is passed on to workers 
in the form of lower wages.6 Royalty (2005) examines the choices that 
workers make among health plans within a given ﬁrm when those plans 
receive different employer subsidies and require different employee con-
tributions, and ﬁnds evidence of an incomplete trade-off between wages 
and health insurance. Baicker and Chandra (2006), exploiting variation 
in health insurance costs driven by variation in medical malpractice pay-
ments, similarly ﬁnd an incomplete trade-off between wages and health 
beneﬁts. These recent studies all concur that there is a trade-off between 
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whether workers are willing to accept a dollar-for-dollar reduction in 
wages in exchange for receiving health beneﬁts or a lesser reduction, is 
still open to question. 
Health insurance may also affect wages through mechanisms other 
than a direct trade-off between wages and fringe beneﬁts. For example, 
health insurance has the potential to affect the job matching process. 
As discussed earlier, the costs of relinquishing health insurance upon 
job change may lead individuals to remain in their current jobs even if 
higher productivity job alternatives are available. This productivity loss 
would presumably result in lower levels of compensation as well. Gru-
ber and Madrian (1997) ﬁnd evidence that unemployed individuals who 
have access to continued health insurance coverage while out of work 
spend more time unemployed (presumably searching for better jobs) and 
are subsequently reemployed at higher wages. This evidence is at least 
suggestive that health insurance may impact the process through which 
workers are sorted into the jobs where their productivity is greatest. 
The U.S. Health Insurance System and Health Care Outcomes 
Despite a large and growing body of literature on the impact of U.S. 
health insurance institutions on labor market outcomes, surprisingly 
little attention has been focused on the effect of U.S. health insurance 
institutions on health outcomes. As Levy and Meltzer (2004) noted in 
a recent survey of the literature on health and health insurance: “Liter-
ally hundreds of studies have documented the fact that the uninsured 
have worse health outcomes than the insured…. Very few of these stud-
ies establish a causal relationship between health insurance and health, 
however.” Beyond the question of whether health insurance as a general 
proposition impacts health is the question of whether, or how, the U.S. 
health care system impacts health. 
The U.S. system of health insurance provision is anything but stable 
for most individuals. Although some people may never experience a spell 
without health insurance, the type of health insurance coverage that indi-
viduals have is likely to change several times over the course of a lifetime 
as they change jobs or move between different types of public, private, or 
other coverage. And many people will experience not only changes in the 
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source of their health insurance coverage, but also intermittent or some-
times lengthy spells without any coverage. What implications does the 
patchwork-quilt nature of the U.S. health care system have for health? 
One way in which the system can impact both health and medical care 
expenditures is through its effect on the incentives to invest in socially 
efﬁcient preventive care or disease management. Some forms of preven-
tive medicine have both short-term costs and short-term beneﬁts (for 
example, a ﬂu vaccine). Others, however, have short-term costs but much 
longer-term beneﬁts (for example, weight control, smoking cessation, 
diabetes management). Under the current system of health insurance pro-
vision in the United States, no one may have the appropriate incentives to 
make socially efﬁcient investments in preventive care if the costs accrue 
in the short term (or on an ongoing basis), but the beneﬁts (lower costs in 
the future) accrue only many years hence.
Any investments in health that yield a payoff beyond an insured’s expected 
tenure with the insurance provider (either an employer, a public insurer, or 
a private insurer) will not be cost-effective for the insurer to provide. And 
individuals, who are largely insensitive to the price of medical care by vir-
tue of being insured, will also have little incentive to make personal invest-
ments today that lead to reduced social costs in the future. Moreover, to 
the extent that some types of preventive measures involve investments that 
are not speciﬁc to the insurer or the insured (for example, investments in 
computer systems to help doctors monitor patient conditions that are not 
speciﬁc to the patients covered by a particular insurer), the large number 
of agents in the current system will result in a free-rider problem and the 
underprovision of socially valuable preventive investments.
Beaulieu, Cutler, and Ho (2003) discuss these problems for the spe-
ciﬁc case of diabetes management. They analyze monitoring systems that 
reduce the long-run costs of diabetes, but that yield a payoff only over the 
time span of several years. They note that from a social perspective, the 
long-run beneﬁts of these monitoring systems far exceed the costs. But, 
from the perspective of a proﬁt-maximizing insurer, the private beneﬁts 
to the ﬁrm are negative for the ﬁrst few years, and the ﬁrm only begins 
to break even after a decade. As a consequence, ﬁrms with high levels of 
turnover are unlikely to invest in such systems, because other insurers are 
the ones who will reap the beneﬁts.157 Brigitte C. Madrian
Another way in which the system can impact health is through   
disruptions in the continuity of care as individuals move between dif-
ferent health insurance providers or between spells of insurance and 
uninsurance. The “startup” costs of interacting with the health system 
following a change in health insurance (for example, ﬁnding a new 
doctor) may lead individuals to delay getting treatment. Or, individu-
als who lose health insurance coverage may delay getting needed treat-
ment, hoping to obtain insurance coverage before things get “too bad.”   
Individuals who are transitioning from one doctor to another as a result 
of a change in health insurance coverage may also generate increased 
medical expenditures through the duplication of tests or diagnostic pro-
cedures done to generate measures of baseline health status or to deter-
mine an appropriate course of treatment. Their health may also suffer 
if there are miscommunications between the old and new medical care 
providers about the nature of an individual health condition and/or its 
treatment.
Conclusion 
There is an important relationship between labor market outcomes and 
the institutions and rules governing health insurance provision in the 
United States. Health insurance is an important factor in almost every 
labor market decision made by individuals: whether to work, where to 
work, and how much to work. It is also an important factor in the human 
resource decisions made by employers: how many workers to hire, whom 
to hire, and how to structure the terms and conditions of employment. 
An important lesson to be learned from the experience of the United 
States is that, while employer provision of health insurance is a conve-
nient way to ﬁnance insurance beneﬁts without involving the government 
budget directly, not everyone is tied to the labor market. Reliance on and 
encouragement of employer provision of health insurance will invariably 
result in government programs to ﬁll in the gaps—to cover the otherwise 
uninsured either in whole or in part. But it is the interplay between these 
various institutions, some tied directly to the labor market and others 
not, that results in distortions of the labor market decisions of individuals 
and ﬁrms.
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■ This paper draws quite extensively on three previously written papers: 
“Health Insurance Portability, Labor Supply, and Job Mobility,” July 
2004, written for the Inter-American Conference on Social Security; 
“Health Insurance and the Labor Market,” in The Political Economy 
of Health Care Reforms, edited by Huizhong Zhou (Kalamazoo, MI: 
Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 2001); and “Health, Health 
Insurance, and the Labor Market,” (with Janet Currie) in Handbook 
of Labor Economics, Volume 3, edited by Orley Ashenfelter and David 
Card (Amsterdam: Elsevier-North Holland, 1999).
Notes
1. At the time that the federal Medicare program was implemented, individuals 
were not eligible for Social Security beneﬁts until age 65.
2. It is also interesting to consider why employers are the primary providers of 
health insurance, but not other types of insurance.
3. If individuals value their current health insurance coverage more than Medi-
care, which is not implausible, there may still be some deterrent to retirement 
from having nonportable health insurance coverage even after individuals are 
eligible for Medicare.
4.  Minnesota, in 1974, was the ﬁrst state to pass a continuation of coverage law. 
Several states passed similar laws over the next decade. See Gruber and Madrian 
(1995, 1996) for more detail on continuation of coverage laws.
5. See Berger et al. (1999) for more detail on the health insurance portability 
aspects of HIPAA.
6. Gruber and Krueger (1991) exploit changes in the cost of offering workers’ 
compensation insurance across states largely driven by changes in the medical 
component of workers’ compensation; they estimate the impact on wages of 
changes in the value of workers’ compensation beneﬁts. Gruber (1994) exploits 
the widespread adoption of maternity beneﬁts following the Pregnancy Discrimi-
nation Act of 1978, to estimate the impact on wages of this type of additional 
health insurance.
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Care System and Labor Markets” 
Henry S. Farber
Brigitte Madrian did a wonderful job summarizing the reasons why link-
ing health insurance to employment is just a terrible idea. Her paper 
reminds me of a trip I took to China in 1990 to work on Chinese labor 
market reform. In theory, I was there to advise the Chinese government 
on that issue. One of the rigidities in their market is that housing is linked 
to employment; so, in order to change employers, workers actually have 
to ﬁnd new housing. Now, you can imagine what that does to mobility 
and the proper allocation of workers to jobs. In the United States, health 
insurance plays a similar role, and Brigitte is a pioneer in looking at job 
lock and the effect of health insurance on ﬂexibility in the labor market. 
She reminded me yesterday that, when she ﬁrst suggested this idea, I said, 
“Oh, you’ll never ﬁnd anything.” Well, I was wrong.
Linking health insurance to employment is not a good idea, even aside 
from the problems of adverse selection. As Brigitte established, however, 
employer-provided health insurance is the modal source of insurance in 
the United States for the non-elderly, and this link has important conse-
quences for both the labor and product markets. To take the example 
that Brigitte used, the health insurance costs of General Motors (GM) 
are more extreme than those of Wal-Mart—and, indeed, more extreme 
than the health insurance costs of most other companies. This is largely 
because the United Auto Workers (UAW) union was able to negotiate very, 
very generous health insurance beneﬁts for pensioners, and GM has more 
pensioners than active employees right now. That set of circumstances 
has led to real problems, as international product market competition 
has made it difﬁcult to sustain generous health insurance coverage and 
remain competitive. In a sense, it is not surprising that GM’s bond status 
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has been downgraded.1 Of course, there are many differences between 
GM and Wal-Mart other than how they treat their health insurance.
Looking more generally at employer-provided health insurance, Figure 
5.1 shows data from tabulations of workers between the ages of 20 and 
64 from various Current Population Surveys that asked what fraction 
are covered by health insurance offered by their own employer. That is, 
leaving aside the possibility of getting insurance from someone else, you 
can see that the fraction of the population covered by own-employer-pro-
vided health insurance between the late 1970s and 2005 has fallen from 
around 72 percent to 64 percent. 
This decline has important distributional consequences that have not 
yet been mentioned. Not everyone has the same access to employer-pro-
vided health insurance; nor is it the case that all employed workers have 
the same access to employer-provided health insurance. I think these 
equity considerations alone are an important argument for universal cov-
erage and for disconnecting health insurance from employment.
I agree with Brigitte that the linkage of health insurance with employ-
ment can skew labor market decisions. The need for health insurance can 
Figure 5.1
Fraction of the Labor Force Covered by Own-Employer Health Insurance
Source: Current Population Survey (May 1979, 1983, 1988, 1993, February    
1995, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2005).
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certainly tie workers to jobs. Workers who lose jobs may ﬁnd themselves 
without health insurance coverage, and there is a lot of job displacement 
going on. The hallmark of the American labor market is its dynamism: 
jobs are destroyed, jobs are created, and we have an enviable record of 
employment growth over the last 30 years compared with European 
countries. Since 1980, annual employment growth in the United States 
has averaged about 1½ percent; in Germany, it has averaged approxi-
mately one-third of one percent. Part of the reason for the faster pace of 
growth in the United States is that we do not penalize employers for lay-
ing off workers. Also, workers can move freely from one ﬁrm to another. 
This is all good, but if health insurance were not tying people to jobs, we 
could have even more dynamism. Something that was not mentioned is 
that workers may be reluctant to move into self-employment because of 
the difﬁculty in ﬁnding affordable insurance. One would think that the 
George W. Bush White House would be very interested in an initiative 
that could rekindle the entrepreneurial spirit in America, and universal 
health insurance coverage might do just that.
Now, to build on some work that I did with Helen Levy (1998) a num-
ber of years ago, it turns out that not all jobs are created equal. It is well 
known that part-time workers are less likely than full-time workers to be 
covered by employer-provided health insurance, as is allowed by Internal 
Revenue Service rules. In order for employee beneﬁts to be tax-deductible, 
they cannot be awarded on the basis of wages. That is, employers are not 
allowed to give beneﬁts only to their high-wage employees. However, they 
are permitted to discriminate on the basis of hours worked and to deny 
beneﬁts to part-time workers. This is the game that Wal-Mart plays very, 
very well. They deﬁne a high threshold for full-time work in terms of mini-
mum hours and, as a consequence, only a small fraction of their workforce 
is covered by insurance provided by Wal-Mart. For example, in Maryland 
in 2005, less than 8 percent of Wal-Mart’s wage bill came from employee 
beneﬁts.2 Workers who are new to their jobs are also less likely to be cov-
ered by employer-provided health insurance. This is the result of waiting 
periods, which employers have increasingly used to their advantage.
Figure 5.2 decomposes the labor force into four groups. The top line 
represents what I call “old full-time jobs”: workers who have been in 
their job for more than a year and who are employed on a full-time basis. 
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A large, though declining, fraction of these workers (from 84 percent in 
1979 to 76 percent in 2005) are covered by employer-provided health 
insurance. The bottom line represents “new part-time workers”: people 
in a part-time job who have been in that job for less than a year. Only 
about 10 percent of these workers are covered by employer-provided 
health insurance. The second line from the top—the middle group—rep-
resents “new full-time workers”: those who just started a full-time job, 
and coverage for these workers fell from 61 to 47 percent between 1979 
and 2005. The third line from the top is for “old part-time workers” who 
have been at their jobs for a while, and about 30 percent of these workers 
are covered by employer-provided health insurance.  
Coverage is the result of decisions by employers regarding whether 
or not to offer health insurance and, if so, which workers are eligible. 
What is the fraction of workers who are in ﬁrms that actually offer health 
insurance coverage? Ninety percent of full-time workers who have been 
in their job for more than a year work in ﬁrms that offer health insurance 
(see Figure 5.3). That does not necessarily mean that they are eligible 
for health insurance, only that their ﬁrms offer it. At the other extreme, 
Figure 5.2
Fraction of the Labor Force Covered by Own-Employer Health Insurance, by 
Job Type
Source: Current Population Survey (May 1979, 1983, 1988, 1993, February 
1995, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2005).
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only 50 percent of workers in new part-time jobs work in ﬁrms that offer 
health insurance. Here, “offer health insurance” means that a ﬁrm offers 
health insurance to at least one employee. 
Figure 5.4 shows, for each part of the employed labor force, the share 
eligible for employer-provided beneﬁts. This is the fraction of workers 
who both work for an employer that offers health insurance and are 
eligible to receive that insurance. Again, full-time workers who have 
been at their jobs for a while are much more likely to be eligible than 
other workers. Part-time workers are much less likely to be eligible for 
employer-provided health insurance. All four groups registered declines 
in this measure from the late 1980s through the mid 1990s, although the 
situation has generally stabilized since then.
Figure 5.5 shows, again for each part of the employed labor force, 
the fraction of workers eligible for employer-provided health insurance 
among workers in ﬁrms that offer health insurance. That is, conditional 
on being in a ﬁrm that offers health insurance, Figure 5.5 shows the frac-
tion of employees who are eligible for that insurance. Almost all full-time 
workers who have been at these ﬁrms for a while are eligible, but rela-
Figure 5.3
Fraction of the Labor Force in Firms Offering Health Insurance, by Job Type
Source: Current Population Survey (May 1979, 1983, 1988, 1993, February    
1995, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2005).
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Figure 5.4
Fraction of the Labor Force Eligible for Own-Employer Health Insurance, by 
Job Type
Source: Current Population Survey (May 1979, 1983, 1988, 1993, February 
1995, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2005).
Figure 5.5
Fraction of Employees in Firms Offering Health Insurance Who Are Eligible, by 
Job Type
Source: Current Population Survey (May 1979, 1983, 1988, 1993, February 
1995, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2005).
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tively few of the part-time workers are eligible for coverage. This reﬂects 
the exclusion of part-time workers in many ﬁrms from eligibility, as well 
as the introduction of waiting periods for new employees.
Table 5.1 presents tabulations of health insurance status by sex and 
marital status. These tabulations provide strong evidence for the effect 
of health insurance on labor markets. The lesson I want to draw from 
these data is that single men and single women do not differ all that much 
from each other, but there is a huge disparity in employer-provided health 
insurance coverage between married men and married women.
The health insurance status of unmarried workers does not vary sub-
stantially by sex.  In contrast, married women, relative to married men, 
are (1) more likely to work for ﬁrms that do not offer health insurance, 
(2) less likely to be covered by employer-provided health insurance, (3) 
more likely to decline coverage, and (4) more likely to be ineligible for 
coverage. These differences survive multivariate analyses that control for 
other differences across workers.
It seems clear that workers systematically choose different jobs based, 
at least in part, on demand for health insurance. The linkage of health 
insurance to employment is neither the best way to utilize talent nor the 
best way to allocate labor. The prescription obviously is to provide health 
insurance independent of ﬁrm-speciﬁc employment. 
Table 5.1 
Health Insurance (HI) Status by Sex and Marital Status, 1979–2005
Source:  Current Population Survey (May 1979, 1988, April 1993, February 
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Notes
1. Since the June 2005 conference, health care costs have continued to have an 
adverse effect on GM’s earnings. In October 2005, General Motors announced 
an agreement with the UAW reducing the cost of health care for union members, 
retirees, and their families by $1 billion a year. They have also continued to close 
U.S. plants and lay off workers. As of January 2007, the UAW was in talks with 
GM, Ford, and Chrysler about the possibility of the union’s assuming responsibil-
ity for billions in retiree health care costs in the future. The UAW proposed these 
talks as a way of assuring that retirees’ health care coverage would not be lost in 
case of a bankruptcy ﬁling, and as a way of helping the automakers to compete. 
2. Wal-Mart has come under ﬁre for its labor practices, and in 2006 Maryland 
passed a law forcing Wal-Mart to extend health insurance coverage to a greater 
share of its workers in Maryland. Later that year, the law was overturned in 
federal court on the grounds that it violated the Employment Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA). In early 2007, Wal-Mart and the Service Employees Inter-
national Union (SEIU) stood together and agreed on a series of goals for achiev-
ing universal health coverage. Wal-Mart and the SEIU are calling for universal 
coverage by a speciﬁc date—around 2012—and have said that this is a shared 
responsibility, emphasizing that individuals, businesses, and government all play 
a role in ﬁnancing health care and expanding coverage.
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